Trial Lawyer

State v. Payne and the Limits of Compassionate Release

Published on: January 27, 2026 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Release-300x300 New Jersey’s Compassionate Release Act is supposed to do one thing well. It exists to ensure incarceration does not become a death sentence for someone who is seriously ill, medically vulnerable, or otherwise unable to be safely housed. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Celestine Payne is a reminder, though, that medical eligibility is not the end of the analysis. Even when a person meets the statute’s medical requirements and shows low public safety risk, release remains discretionary. The State can still defeat the motion if it proves extraordinary aggravating circumstances.

Payne is not a close call on facts. The opinion recounts a disturbing pattern of calculated violence tied to a broader scheme involving life-insurance fraud, manipulation of family and friends, and multiple acts of violence, including an attempted murder and two murders. The Court highlighted the planning, the use of people around her, and the brutality of what happened, including the allegation that, after one victim survived, Payne went to the hospital, posed as his mother, and signed a do-not-resuscitate order. The point was not to relitigate guilt. The point was to explain why the State argued this case fell into the narrow category of truly exceptional and rare conduct.

What made the decision legally important is the procedural posture. The trial court found Payne met the Act’s medical and public safety requirements, but still denied release based on what the Supreme Court previously recognized as an extraordinary aggravating factor. The trial court concluded the offense involved conduct that was particularly heinous, cruel, or depraved. The Appellate Division reversed, reasoning that the facts did not meaningfully exceed what courts often see in murder prosecutions. The Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the denial.

New Jersey Supreme Court Ruling Shapes Discovery Obligations For Criminal Defense Attorneys in Hudson County and Beyond

Published on: March 5, 2024 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-Witness-Statement-300x199 The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in State v. Isaiah J. Knight offers a nuanced examination of the limits of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, particularly focusing on the circumstances surrounding an affidavit recanting a witness’s previous identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. The facts of this case play a crucial role in understanding the Court’s rationale and its implications for criminal defense.

On June 1, 2021, Tyzier White was fatally shot outside the Neptune Lounge in Newark. Two witnesses, known by the nicknames “Zay” and “DJ Neptune,” identified Isaiah Knight as the shooter based on sworn statements and photo arrays. Subsequently, Isaiah Knight was arrested. However, in December 2021, Zay reported being coerced into recanting his original statement through a written affidavit while being held at gunpoint by individuals, including the defendant’s sister and cousin. This affidavit aimed to exonerate Knight by claiming Zay’s initial identification was made under duress from detectives.

The State sought to obtain this recanting affidavit from the defense, asserting that it constituted physical evidence of crimes (witness tampering and kidnapping) related to the initial murder charge. The defense objected, invoking constitutional protections to resist disclosing the affidavit. Nonetheless, the trial court and later the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the State, compelling the disclosure of the affidavit under the reciprocal discovery rules.

Navigating the Complexities of Witness Tampering Laws: Insights from a Jersey City Criminal Defense Attorney

Published on: February 16, 2024 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Jersey City Criminal Lawyer In a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court provided critical insights into the state’s witness tampering statute through the case of State v. William Hill. This case scrutinized the boundaries of lawful communication and witness intimidation, posing significant implications for criminal defense strategies.

The core of the dispute revolved around William Hill, who faced charges of first-degree carjacking. While awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the victim, asserting his innocence and urging the victim to “tell the truth” if unsure about his identity as the perpetrator. This act led to additional charges of third-degree witness tampering, sparking a legal debate over the constitutionality of New Jersey’s witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).

The Supreme Court’s analysis clarified that while the statute is not overbroad on its face, its application in Hill’s case raised constitutional concerns. The court highlighted the nuanced distinction between permissible advocacy and unlawful witness tampering. Specifically, it underscored the necessity for the state to demonstrate that such communications were intended to cause a witness to testify falsely or otherwise obstruct justice, which was not sufficiently established in Hill’s case.

In-Person vs. Video Remote Interpreting in Criminal Jury Trials

Published on: September 2, 2023 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Hudson County Interpreter In a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court weighed in on a crucial issue of first impression: Must a criminal defendant be provided in-person interpreting services during a jury trial, or will video remote interpreting (VRI) suffice? The case of State v. Juracan-Juracan dives into this question, addressing a major point of contention within the legal community—especially given the significant adjustments courts have had to make in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native speaker of the Kaqchikel language, was charged with multiple offenses related to alleged sexual assault. Juracan-Juracan requested a Kaqchikel interpreter for his trial, but because the interpreter resided on the West Coast and only spoke Kaqchikel and Spanish, a second interpreter was needed to translate between Spanish and English. The interpreter himself expressed concerns about the effectiveness of remote interpretation during the jury trial. Despite these concerns, the trial court denied the request for in-person interpreting, citing financial constraints among other reasons.

The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Court made several crucial points:

Attorney Steve Natoli Wins Appeal, Vacating Client’s Conviction and 23 Year Prison Sentence

Published on: December 7, 2022 | by HCCL Blog Staff

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-rotated Attorney Stephen Natoli successfully argued before a three-judge panel that his client’s rights had been violated during a 2019 trial handled by prior counsel. Following the trial, Defendant was sentenced to twenty-three (23) years in prison. He had been serving his prison sentence when he retained Mr. Natoli for his appeal.

At issue on appeal was whether or not, a testifying detective could narrate a video of the incident and render a lay opinion regarding an ultimate issue in the case: the cause of the car wreck.

Also at issue was whether or not valid waiver of Defendant’s appearance had occurred on the day of a crucial pre-trial testimonial hearing.

Invocation of Your Right to Counsel: How Concise Must Your Request for Counsel Be?

Published on: April 18, 2022 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Police-Interrogation-Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer--300x158 Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the laws of New Jersey, suspects are entitled to have an attorney present while they are held in custody for questioning.

But how explicit must your request for counsel be?

In State v. Laura Gonzalez, the Supreme Court of New Jersey answered this question.

New Jersey’s Three Strikes Law and Juvenile Offenses

Published on: April 15, 2022 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Jersey-City-Three-Strikes-Attorney-300x197 Three Strikes Laws were adopted in certain jurisdictions to protect the public from habitual offenders who repeatedly commit certain violent crimes. These law typically mandate a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a third-time offender.

In New Jersey, the crimes that constitute “strikes” include those such as murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, sexual assault and robbery.

But should crimes committed as juveniles be considered predicate offenses under the rule?

Prior Convictions Unlawfully Preventing Defendants from Testifying at their own Trials

Published on: February 7, 2022 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Jersey-City-Criminal-Lawyer-Testifying-Witness--300x169 Witness “impeachment” refers to the process of attacking a witness’s credibility and the accuracy of their testimony at trial. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the New Jersey Rules of Evidence both allow the impeachment of a witness’s credibility by use of their prior convictions. However, when the witness is a defendant testifying in their own trial, there are specific rules that apply to the State’s use of their prior convictions.

Under the N.J.R.E. 609, the use of a prior conviction is limited “[i]f, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have passed since the witness’s conviction for a crime or release from confinement for it, whichever is later.” The rule also states that when a conviction is ten years remote, it “is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of the evidence having the burden of proof.”

On December 27, 2021 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided in State v. Tywaun S. Hedgespeth that a lower court’s ruling, allowing the use of Defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes was not harmless error.

Gun Charges and the Confrontation Clause

Published on: January 20, 2022 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Hudson-County-and-Bergen-County-Gun-Charge-Lawyer-300x169

The Confrontation Clause, which is found in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, provides that “in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses against him”. Article 1, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution also guarantees this right to the criminally accused.

In some cases, however, the “witness” may be the person who has prepared a document or report for submission to the court. As the Supreme Court established in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, affidavits reporting the findings of a search or analysis may be considered “testimonial” and renders the affiants “witnesses” that are subject to the defendant’s right to confrontation.

On December 27, 2021 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided in State v. Jose Carrion that the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. The Court came to this conclusion based on the circumstances surrounding the submission of an affidavit prepared by a non-testifying detective which contained the results of a firearms database search.

Criminal Statute Partially Struck Down on First Amendment Grounds

Published on: December 16, 2021 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Jersey-City-Criminal-Lawyer-Natoli-Free-Speech--300x300 On December 9, 2021 the New Jersey Appellate Division published a decision which struck down a portion of New Jersey’s terroristic threats statute. In State v. Calvin Fair, the defendant was charged with and convicted of terroristic threats. On appeal, Defendant argued constitutional over breadth regarding N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). Said section criminalizes threats of violence made with the purpose to terrorize another […] or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. A three-judge panel agreed with the appellant’s arguments and struck down subsection (a). This resulted in a reversal of Defendant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial.

In Fair, the court analyzed different opinions throughout our nation’s state and federal courts. The court analyzed this case, in part, through the lens of the “true-threat” doctrine. The “true-threat” doctrine recognizes that our nation has a “profound national commitment to the debate on public issues which may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks […]” as well as “vituperative, abusive and inexact language.”

The court then focused on Virginia v. Black which held that Virginia’s criminal statute did “not run afoul of the First Amendment” because it did not just ban cross burning; it banned cross burning “with intent to intimidate.” The Court in Black held that a state can punish threatening speech or expression only when the speaker “means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”