Articles Posted in Criminal Attorney

Release-300x300New Jersey’s Compassionate Release Act is supposed to do one thing well. It exists to ensure incarceration does not become a death sentence for someone who is seriously ill, medically vulnerable, or otherwise unable to be safely housed. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Celestine Payne is a reminder, though, that medical eligibility is not the end of the analysis. Even when a person meets the statute’s medical requirements and shows low public safety risk, release remains discretionary. The State can still defeat the motion if it proves extraordinary aggravating circumstances.

Payne is not a close call on facts. The opinion recounts a disturbing pattern of calculated violence tied to a broader scheme involving life-insurance fraud, manipulation of family and friends, and multiple acts of violence, including an attempted murder and two murders. The Court highlighted the planning, the use of people around her, and the brutality of what happened, including the allegation that, after one victim survived, Payne went to the hospital, posed as his mother, and signed a do-not-resuscitate order. The point was not to relitigate guilt. The point was to explain why the State argued this case fell into the narrow category of truly exceptional and rare conduct.

What made the decision legally important is the procedural posture. The trial court found Payne met the Act’s medical and public safety requirements, but still denied release based on what the Supreme Court previously recognized as an extraordinary aggravating factor. The trial court concluded the offense involved conduct that was particularly heinous, cruel, or depraved. The Appellate Division reversed, reasoning that the facts did not meaningfully exceed what courts often see in murder prosecutions. The Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the denial.

Juror-Misconduct-1-300x300The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ebenezer Byrd is about something most people don’t think about until it happens: what a judge has to do when there is a credible report that a juror may be breaking the rules in the middle of a criminal trial. At its core, the case reinforces a basic promise of the justice system – jurors must decide guilt or innocence based only on the evidence presented in court, not outside information, outside conversations, or conclusions reached before deliberations begin.

In Byrd, court staff received a call reporting “alarming” conduct by a sitting juror. The report claimed the juror had discussed the case with coworkers, shown articles to others, “Googled” the case, and had already decided she would convict, using the phrase that she was going to “burn their asses.” Even though some details were unclear and the information passed through a few people before reaching the judge, the trial court treated it as serious enough to question the juror.

The Supreme Court’s concern was that the questioning did not match the seriousness of what was alleged. The judge asked the juror general questions, including whether she had encountered “posting or newspaper articles” outside of what was presented in court, but the Supreme Court found that approach too narrow and too generic for allegations like internet research and a mind already made up. In other words, once the court decides an allegation is plausible enough to investigate, it has to ask direct, fact-specific questions aimed at the allegation itself.

Seizing-Evidence-during-Fire-300x300The New Jersey Supreme Court’s December 4, 2025 decision in State v. Caneiro is a big reminder that “exigent circumstances” is not a slogan courts apply in hindsight, but an objective, fact-sensitive test grounded in what officers reasonably knew in the moment. Here, the Court focused on whether the exigent-circumstances exception applied during an active house fire, where officers believed that getting a warrant was impracticable and immediate action was needed to prevent the destruction of evidence located in an attached garage.

The case arises from a 5:02 a.m. house fire at Paul Caneiro’s home in November 2018. While firefighters were still battling an active blaze in the main structure, police entered the attached garage and seized a security system DVR without a warrant, about forty minutes after first arrival and roughly thirty minutes after the small garage fire had been extinguished. The State alleges the DVR captured Caneiro disconnecting the security cameras before starting the fire. Later, the defendant gave valid consent to search the DVR’s contents. The trial court suppressed the DVR, stressing that the garage fire had been out for nearly thirty minutes and characterizing the officers’ retrieval as calm and deliberate. The Appellate Division affirmed.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that under the totality of circumstances, the warrantless seizure was objectively reasonable because time was of the essence and securing a warrant was impracticable while the fire remained active and suppression efforts threatened the integrity of sensitive digital evidence. The Court looked at the whole scene, not just the garage in isolation, and rejected the idea that officers’ calm demeanor meant there was no real emergency. The question, it emphasized, is not how things look in a quiet courtroom years later, but what a reasonable officer on that chaotic scene could conclude at the time.

Image-Law-300x300In State v. Juan C. Hernandez-Peralta (decided July 22, 2025), the New Jersey Supreme Court answered a practical question that comes up all the time in criminal practice: how far does a defense lawyer have to go to investigate a client’s immigration status? The Court held that, on the facts of this case, sentencing counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for asking, “Are you a U.S. citizen?”, getting a clear “yes”, and relying on that answer, even though the client later turned out to be a noncitizen who faced deportation.

The underlying case started with a series of burglaries and a robbery in Lakewood in 2019. Hernandez-Peralta pled guilty to three counts of third-degree burglary and one count of second-degree robbery. At his plea hearing, he told the judge he was a U.S. citizen and said he was born in New York. On the standard New Jersey plea form, he also answered that he was a citizen. Despite that answer, his plea lawyer still went through the immigration questions and warned him that if he was not a citizen, his guilty plea could lead to removal from the United States and block him from legally re-entering.

The presentence report, however, told a slightly different story. It listed his place of birth as Mexico, noted that he came to New York as a young child. The report also left several fields blank, including “Alien Status” and “Citizenship.” At sentencing, a different public defender represented him. She had the presentence report, reviewed it with him, and asked him directly if he was a U.S. citizen. Once again, he said yes. She did not independently investigate his status, obtain immigration records, or give case-specific immigration advice. The negotiated sentence, Recovery Court probation with a backup NERA prison term, was imposed.

Image-3-200x300The New Jersey Supreme Court has continued to reinforce the strength of our State Constitution’s warrant protections in its recent decision, State v. Fenimore. The Court unanimously held that the automobile exception does not permit police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle once law enforcement has full control over the car, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. In Fenimore, the defendant had been arrested for DWI inside a State Police barracks, the passenger had been removed, officers had possession of the keys, and the vehicle was required to be held for a mandatory twelve-hour impound period under John’s Law. Despite these circumstances, where mobility, safety concerns, and the risk of evidence destruction were completely neutralized, the State Police searched the car in the station parking lot without obtaining a warrant.

At the suppression hearing, a crucial detail emerged: because this was a DWI arrest, John’s Law required that the car be impounded for at least twelve hours, and the trooper openly admitted the vehicle was not going anywhere. That admission gutted the State’s claim that this was the kind of mobile, rapidly unfolding situation that justifies the automobile exception. The State tried to save the search by pointing to hypothetical risks of third-party tampering and by characterizing the barracks parking lot as effectively still “on scene,” but the Supreme Court rejected the idea that speculative fears can create exigency where police already have full control over the car, its occupants, and the keys.

Relying on State v. Witt, the Court reiterated that New Jersey’s automobile exception is intentionally narrow and applies only to true on-scene situations involving spontaneous probable cause and real-time exigency. The search in Fenimore occurred in a controlled environment where any urgency had been neutralized: the driver was in custody, the passenger removed, the keys seized, and the car subject to mandatory impound. Under those facts, the Court held that the police were constitutionally required to seek judicial approval before searching. With no valid exception to the warrant requirement, the search violated the New Jersey Constitution, and the Court ordered suppression of the evidence.

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-Witness-Statement-300x199The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in State v. Isaiah J. Knight offers a nuanced examination of the limits of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, particularly focusing on the circumstances surrounding an affidavit recanting a witness’s previous identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. The facts of this case play a crucial role in understanding the Court’s rationale and its implications for criminal defense.

On June 1, 2021, Tyzier White was fatally shot outside the Neptune Lounge in Newark. Two witnesses, known by the nicknames “Zay” and “DJ Neptune,” identified Isaiah Knight as the shooter based on sworn statements and photo arrays. Subsequently, Isaiah Knight was arrested. However, in December 2021, Zay reported being coerced into recanting his original statement through a written affidavit while being held at gunpoint by individuals, including the defendant’s sister and cousin. This affidavit aimed to exonerate Knight by claiming Zay’s initial identification was made under duress from detectives.

The State sought to obtain this recanting affidavit from the defense, asserting that it constituted physical evidence of crimes (witness tampering and kidnapping) related to the initial murder charge. The defense objected, invoking constitutional protections to resist disclosing the affidavit. Nonetheless, the trial court and later the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the State, compelling the disclosure of the affidavit under the reciprocal discovery rules.

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In a landmark decision that underscores the evolving landscape of criminal law, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Brandon M. Washington set forth new guidelines aimed at enhancing the reliability of eyewitness identification, a pivotal issue in criminal defense, especially in jurisdictions like Jersey City. The ruling reflects a nuanced understanding of the psychological underpinnings of eyewitness memory and its vulnerability to suggestion, emphasizing the need for stringent controls over the identification process.

At the heart of the decision is the acknowledgment of the significant impact misidentifications can have on the accused, the victim, and the integrity of the justice system. The Supreme Court’s directive mandates more rigorous procedures for conducting eyewitness identifications, including the recording of such sessions, to ensure transparency and accountability. This decision builds upon the Court’s prior efforts to mitigate the risks associated with eyewitness testimony, which has historically been a contentious point in criminal trials.

For criminal lawyers in Jersey City, this ruling offers a dual opportunity: to advocate for fairer, more reliable identification processes and to challenge identifications that fail to meet the new standards. It necessitates a deeper engagement with the science of memory and the factors that influence recall, equipping defense attorneys with a robust framework to scrutinize eyewitness evidence presented against their clients.

Jersey City Criminal LawyerIn a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court provided critical insights into the state’s witness tampering statute through the case of State v. William Hill. This case scrutinized the boundaries of lawful communication and witness intimidation, posing significant implications for criminal defense strategies.

The core of the dispute revolved around William Hill, who faced charges of first-degree carjacking. While awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the victim, asserting his innocence and urging the victim to “tell the truth” if unsure about his identity as the perpetrator. This act led to additional charges of third-degree witness tampering, sparking a legal debate over the constitutionality of New Jersey’s witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).

The Supreme Court’s analysis clarified that while the statute is not overbroad on its face, its application in Hill’s case raised constitutional concerns. The court highlighted the nuanced distinction between permissible advocacy and unlawful witness tampering. Specifically, it underscored the necessity for the state to demonstrate that such communications were intended to cause a witness to testify falsely or otherwise obstruct justice, which was not sufficiently established in Hill’s case.

Summary

Cell tower evidence lawyer

Cell tower evidence is frequently used in criminal cases.

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently issued a pivotal decision in the case of State v. Roberson Burney, a case dealing with complex issues of evidence admissibility and the potential for cumulative error during a trial. The Court ruled that both expert testimony regarding the defendant’s cell phone location based on a “rule of thumb” approximation and a first-time in-court identification of the defendant were inadmissible. The combination of these errors, the Court held, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-rotatedAttorney Stephen Natoli successfully argued before a three-judge panel that his client’s rights had been violated during a 2019 trial handled by prior counsel.  Following the trial, Defendant was sentenced to twenty-three (23) years in prison.  He had been serving his prison sentence when he retained Mr. Natoli for his appeal.

At issue on appeal was whether or not, a testifying detective could narrate a video of the incident and render a lay opinion regarding an ultimate issue in the case: the cause of the car wreck.

Also at issue was whether or not valid waiver of Defendant’s appearance had occurred on the day of a crucial pre-trial testimonial hearing.

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