New Jersey Criminal Law

Third-Party Payment of Legal Fees Does Not Create a Per Se Conflict: New Jersey Supreme Court Decides State v. Kearney

Published on: August 4, 2026 | by Stephen J. Natoli

Legal-Fees-Paymenr-300x300 The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Kearney addressing a question criminal defense attorneys encounter often but rarely litigate: what happens when someone other than the defendant pays the legal bill, and that person later testifies for the State. The Supreme Court held that a third party’s payment of a defendant’s legal fees does not create a per se conflict of interest, and that on this record the defendant failed to establish an actual conflict either. The Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, and it used the opinion to recommend best practices for documenting third-party fee arrangements going forward.

The case arose from a fatal stabbing in Middlesex County in August 2013. The defendant was at the home of his girlfriend, with whom he shared a child, when a fight broke out among the men in the house. The victim was her cousin. She later told police that after the two of them left together, the defendant said something was wrong with the victim and that he had “poked” him. They returned to find the victim on the floor, and first responders later found him without a pulse. A jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and related offenses, and he received an aggregate fifty-year term subject to the No Early Release Act. The conflict issue arose because the girlfriend had hired the defendant’s trial attorney and paid his fees. She testified that she met with him three times, the last in 2014, and that their conversations concerned payment only. At trial the State called her as its witness and emphasized her second statement to police. Defense counsel’s cross-examination focused instead on her earlier account that the victim had been cut, and drew out that she had been held at the station for roughly sixteen hours, had not been allowed to use a bathroom, and had, in her words, been broken by the experience. Counsel also established that she had not visited his office since 2014, had no contact with him beyond paying the fees, and had retained her own unaffiliated lawyer to prepare for her testimony. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting that the fee arrangement created a conflict. The PCR court denied it without a hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed at 479 N.J. Super. 539.

The Court’s analysis began with the duty of loyalty codified in RPC 1.7 and the two-tier framework from State v. Norman. Courts first ask whether the alleged conflict is a per se conflict, meaning one so inherently fraught with divided loyalties that prejudice is presumed and reversal follows unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived it on the record. That category is deliberately narrow, covering situations such as simultaneous representation of codefendants and, under State v. Cottle, an attorney under indictment in the same county and prosecuted by the same office as his client. If no per se conflict exists, courts ask whether there was an actual conflict and, if so, whether a great likelihood of prejudice resulted. That inquiry is flexible and fact-sensitive, asking whether the lawyer’s representation was materially limited by responsibilities to another client, a third party, or the lawyer’s own interests. The asserted conflict must rest on more than a fanciful possibility, and a bald assertion will not do. The Court also reaffirmed that waiver is never to be inferred from a silent record.

New Jersey Supreme Court Tightens the “Reasonable Diligence” Standard for New Trial Motions: State v. Nirav Patel

Published on: June 9, 2026 | by Stephen J. Natoli

New-Evidence-300x300 The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Nirav Patel that delivers an important message to defendants and defense counsel about newly discovered evidence. The Court held that a defendant who possessed exculpatory documents before trial, knew or had reason to know they existed, and yet never searched for them during the four years between indictment and trial cannot satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement for a new trial. The Court reversed both the trial court and the Appellate Division, which had granted the defendant a new trial, and remanded the matter for sentencing. The decision clarifies how the reasonable diligence prong of the newly discovered evidence standard operates and how much deference appellate courts owe to a trial court’s findings on that question.

The underlying prosecution arose out of a failed restaurant venture in Hoboken. In May 2019, a State grand jury indicted Nirav Patel for second-degree theft by deception. The State alleged that he obtained $750,000 from a group of six investors who believed they were purchasing a 30 percent interest in a planned World of Beer franchise, when in reality Patel owned only a 5 percent interest in the entity that held the franchise rights. The investors’ money was deposited into an account belonging to his family’s business, Bhagu, Inc. A financial crimes investigator testified at trial that the funds were used to pay Patel’s personal expenses, including mortgage and car payments for a residence and a Porsche, to cover debts of the family’s restaurant, and to fund checks made payable directly to Patel. According to the investigator, none of the money ever reached the franchise entity or was used for the benefit of the Hoboken project. In April 2023, nearly four years after the indictment, a jury found Patel guilty.

Eight days after the verdict, Patel moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. At an evidentiary hearing, his sister testified that the family was shocked by the verdict and that she began combing through boxes of documents at their parents’ home, where Patel had lived full-time since 2019. After days of searching, she found eleven pages in the garage referencing Bhagu and World of Beer. Patel then searched his own email accounts using basic terms such as “World of Beer” and “Bhagu,” and within roughly an hour he located complete versions of the documents. Among them were two franchise agreements naming Bhagu, Inc. as the sole franchisee for the Hoboken location and a guaranty reflecting that Patel held a 30 percent interest in an entity called Tapmasters II. Patel argued the documents proved he had authority to sell shares to the investors. World of Beer’s chief development officer testified that he believed the Bhagu agreements were not legitimate and that a search of the company’s records turned up no trace of them. The trial court nonetheless granted a new trial, reasoning that because Patel was involved in many businesses, the evidence was buried among presumably thousands of documents and was not discoverable by reasonable diligence. The Appellate Division affirmed.

State v. DiNapoli: The New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies Causation Defenses in Vehicular Homicide Cases

Published on: May 21, 2026 | by Stephen J. Natoli

The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Thomas J. DiNapoli that carries significant implications for how vehicular homicide cases are litigated across the state. At its core, the Court held that a defendant charged with vehicular homicide has the right to present expert testimony challenging the State’s theory of causation under prong one of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c), even when that testimony does not directly rebut “but for” causation. The Court also held that no preliminary N.J.R.E. 104 hearing is required to determine the admissibility of such expert opinions. For criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors working in Hudson, Essex, Union, Passaic, and counties throughout New Jersey, the decision reshapes how causation defenses are built, disclosed, and presented at trial.

On the afternoon of June 4, 2019, Thomas DiNapoli was driving in Union Township when his vehicle crossed the double yellow lines and struck an oncoming car. The front-seat passenger was ninety-four years old and suffering from dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. She was transported to the hospital with rib and patella fractures and lung contusions. The following day, her family opted for palliative care given her overall condition, and she died later that afternoon. DiNapoli, who had taken his prescribed medication Clonazepam in excess of a normal therapeutic dosage before driving, was charged with second-degree vehicular homicide. The autopsy listed the cause of death as blunt impact injuries sustained in the collision.

To contest the State’s theory that his reckless driving caused the front-seat passenger’s death, DiNapoli proffered three experts who concluded that the injuries were not life-threatening and that she would have recovered from the accident had her family not elected palliative care. In their view, the actual cause of death was respiratory depression brought on by the narcotic medications administered as part of hospice treatment, not the trauma from the crash. The State moved to bar all three experts, and after a procedural history that included a mistrial, the Appellate Division sided with the State and remanded the matter for an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to resolve what it saw as troubling inconsistencies among the defense experts’ reports. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and reversed.