Supreme Court Rules on Trial Court’s Probe into Juror Impropriety

The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ebenezer Byrd is about something most people don’t think about until it happens: what a judge has to do when there is a credible report that a juror may be breaking the rules in the middle of a criminal trial. At its core, the case reinforces a basic promise of the justice system – jurors must decide guilt or innocence based only on the evidence presented in court, not outside information, outside conversations, or conclusions reached before deliberations begin.

In Byrd, court staff received a call reporting “alarming” conduct by a sitting juror. The report claimed the juror had discussed the case with coworkers, shown articles to others, “Googled” the case, and had already decided she would convict, using the phrase that she was going to “burn their asses.” Even though some details were unclear and the information passed through a few people before reaching the judge, the trial court treated it as serious enough to question the juror.

The Supreme Court’s concern was that the questioning did not match the seriousness of what was alleged. The judge asked the juror general questions, including whether she had encountered “posting or newspaper articles” outside of what was presented in court, but the Supreme Court found that approach too narrow and too generic for allegations like internet research and a mind already made up. In other words, once the court decides an allegation is plausible enough to investigate, it has to ask direct, fact-specific questions aimed at the allegation itself.

The Court emphasized that the inquiry must be “searching” and “probing,” not a quick check-in. It also matters whether any improper information or opinions spread to other jurors, because one juror’s misconduct can affect the whole panel. Because the record in Byrd did not adequately answer those questions, the Supreme Court sent the case back for an evidentiary hearing, including individual voir dire of the juror, to determine whether taint occurred and what remedy is needed.

The Court also made a practical, common-sense point about courtroom procedure: when a judge needs to question one juror about possible misconduct, the questioning must happen in open court and outside the presence of the other jurors. The reason is straightforward, if the rest of the jury stays in the room while one juror is questioned about bias or misconduct, the inquiry itself can influence the others and “inject improper considerations” into deliberations, creating the very contamination the court is trying to prevent.

For defense lawyers, Byrd is a valuable tool when issues like “Googling,” outside discussions, or prejudgment come up mid-trial. It supports the argument that a defendant is entitled to more than a juror’s reassurance that they can be fair; the court must test that claim with targeted questions and create a meaningful record showing the verdict is trustworthy. That matters because juror misconduct allegations often arise in real time, under pressure, and Byrd makes clear that the response has to be thorough enough to protect the integrity of the verdict.

For the public, and especially anyone who might one day serve as a juror, the lesson is straightforward. Jury duty is not just about showing up; it is about following strict rules that protect both sides. You cannot research the case, look up names, read articles, check social media, or “fill in gaps” with outside information, even if you think you are being helpful. And you cannot talk about the case with coworkers, friends, or family before deliberations are complete, because those conversations can introduce pressure and information the courtroom never tested. Byrd is a reminder that these rules are not technicalities, they are what make a verdict legitimate, and what allow the community to trust the outcome.